State of Utah v. Jerome Yeck : Consolidated Appeal by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
State of Utah v. Jerome Yeck : Consolidated Appeal
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Caine; Attorney forAppellantRobert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Yeck, No. 14826 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/526
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent ) 
vs. 
JEROME YECK, 
) 
) 
Case No.~ 
1 'Tr.:r..t. ) '-fY'..3 j 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
Consolidated Appeal from the Second Judicial District 
in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, Presiding; and Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hansen, Jr., Presiding. 
ROBERT B. P.ANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
JOHN T. CAINE 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
.!.'. 
FILEo·: 
~. - f; 
MAR -4 1971 
-·--·------··"'···-----·---.. -· ~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rn T!IE SUPRE~rn COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S'f'ATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
JEROHE YECK, 
) 
) Case No. 29511 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
Consolidated Appeal from the Second Judicial District 
in and for l!eber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin 
Gould, Presiding; and Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hansen, Jr., Presiding. 
ROBERT B. P.ANSEN 
Attornev General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Resnondent 
JOHN T. CArnE 
2568 .. Hashington Elvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Aopellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
ARGUMENT. 
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, AND AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 
OF DUE PROCESS, AND WHEN REQUESTED BY THE ACCUSED 
AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO SENTENCING, CANNOT BE DENIED 
UNLESS THE STATE DEMONSTRATES THAT IT WILL BE 
IRREPARABLY DAMAGED O~ THAT THERE IS A COMPELLING 
STATE INTEREST WHICH MUST BE SERVED. 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
3 
9 
CONCLUSION ...... . . . . . . . . 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1975). 
State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825 (1932) 
State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671 (1963). 
STATUTES CITED 
5 
9 
9 
10 
10 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-24-3 (1953) .......... 1, 7, :. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs-
JEROME YECK, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This cause arose from a denial of motions to withdraw 
guilty pleas made by Appellant Jerome Yeck, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-24-3 (1953), which were entered 
in response to criminal proceedings brought by the State 
of Utah, charging him in the Second Judicial District with 
theft by deception, a third degree felony, in violation 
of §76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and in the Third 
Judicial District with one count of forgery, a second 
degree felony, in violation of §76-6-501, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953; and two counts of theft by deception, a 
second degree felony, in violation of §76-6-405, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOPER COURT 
On or about September 1, 1976, the defendant-appellant 
1 
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entered a plea of guilty to the crime of theft by deception, 
a third degree felony, in the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for Weber Countv, State of Utah. 
On or about September 2, 1976, defendant entered a plea of 
guilty to one count of a three-count Information in the 
Third Judicial District to the charge of theft by decep-
tion, a second degree felony. Defendant's sentencing was 
scheduled for September 15, 1976, in the Second Judicial 
District, and Seotember 16, 1976, in the Third Judicial 
District. Upon defendant's ~fotion, prior to those dates, 
the sentencing dates were vacated and on September 22nd 
and September 23rd, resoectively, in the Second and Third 
Judicial Districts, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. 
On September 23, 1976, Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., ruled 
that Appellant's plea could not be withdrawn in the Third 
Judicial District case, and defendant was sentenced to a 
term in the state prison of one to fifteen years, sentence 
to be stayed pending this Appeal, and also pending a 
90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison. 
On October 13, 1976, Judge Calvin Gould ruled that the 
Appellant's plea could not be withdrawn in the Second 
Judicial District case, and Appellant's sentence was stayed 
pending this Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGET ON APPEAL 
Anpellant seeks an order of this Court reversing 
2 
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the judgments rendered by the lower courts, and a ruling 
remanding this cause to the trial courts for trials on all 
of the counts, both those involved in the plea and those 
dismissed, against the defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Apnellant Jerome W. Yeck is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and during the years of 1974 through 
1976, was engaged in various businesses in the northern 
Utah area, principally in Salt Lake County. Most of Appel-
lant's business dealings were in the area of property 
development and other varieties of land transactions. All 
of the charges involved in the instant case arose from 
transactions involving sale or acquisitions of real pro-
perty between Appellant, financial institutions, and other 
third parties. Appellant was initially charged in the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, with one count of forgery in violation 
of §76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a felony of the 
second degree, and two counts of theft by deception, in 
violation of §76-6-405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a 
second degree felony. Contemporaneously with these 
charges, Appellant was charged in the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
with one count of theft by deception, in violation of 
§76-6-Lf05 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a third degree 
3 
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felonv. Furthermore, defendant was informed at the time 
of his arraignment and at subsequent proceedings in the 
Third Judicial District, that the Utah State Attorney Gene-
ral's office had also received complaints to their "1,:rhite 
Collar Crime Section", and that they were prepared to file 
additional felony charges for alleged similar conduct 
against the defendant. Appellant had the assistance of 
counsel throughout all proceedings in the courts below. 
At preliminary hearings in the Salt Lake City Court and 
the Ogden City Court, and at arraignment proceedings in 
the Second and Third Judicial District Courts, and at the 
proceedings snecifically giving rise to this Apneal, 
Appellant was represented by Attorney Phil L. Hansen, a 
member of the Utah State Bar in good standing, from Salt 
Lake City, Utah. At the arraignments in both Districts, 
defendant initially entered pleas of not guilty to all 
charges. Trials were scheduled in late September. Prior 
to the trial dates and on or about the 1st and 2nd day 
of September, 1976, Appellant, upon advice of his counsel, 
entered into plea negotiations with the County Attorney's 
office in both Weber and Salt Lake County. The prose-
cutors involved were Robert L. Wallace for Weber County, 
and Robert Stott for Salt Lake County, and Joseph 
McCarthy, representing the White Collar Crime Division 
of the Utah State Attorney General's office. The 
!+ 
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arrangement concluded from the negotiations was that the 
Appellant would enter a plea of guilty to the theft by 
deception charge in Weber County, and would plead guilty 
to one theft by deception count in Salt Lake County. In 
return for these pleas, Salt Lake County would dismiss 
the other two counts of the Information alleging forgery 
and theft by deception. The Weber County Attorney would 
agree that the Appellant should be sentenced to a maximum 
of only five years in the state prison, rather than 1-15 
years, as the case had actually arisen prior to the 
criminal code revisions of 1973, and the Utah State Attor-
ney General's office agreed not to proceed with any 
charges or complaints filed in their office. Appellant 
then entered guilty pleas in Weber and Salt Lake County, 
and was referred for oresentence investigative reports in 
both counties by the Utah State Department of Adult Pro-
bation and Parole, and was scheduled for sentencing on 
September 15th and 16th, 1976, respectively, in Ueber 
and Salt Lake Counties. At the time of the entering of 
the pleas, both Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., in Salt 
Lake County, and Judge Calvin Gould in Weber County, 
examined the Appellant extensively, pursuant to the 
required inquiries of Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
Appellant responded appropriately to the questions posed 
by the judges, that he was entering his plea voluntarily, 
5 
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without any duress or coercion, that he understood the con-
sequences of his plea, that he was doing so on the advice 
of counsel, and that he understood that the judges had 
made and would make no advance nromises as to the eventual 
sentence to be imposed. The pleas of guilty were accepted 
by both judges. Subsequent to apnellant's entering pleas 
of guilty, but prior to sentencing, Appellant contacted 
Attorney John T. Caine, a member in good standing of the 
Utah State Bar, p~1cticing in Ogden, Utah. Appellant 
explained to the attorney that he did not believe, in 
fact, that he was guilty of the offenses charged, that 
he had not intended to defraud or to do any acts which 
injured anyone. In reviewing the cases with the Appel-
lant, Caine informed the Appellant that it was his opinion 
that he did have realistic and viable defenses to the 
charges, and that in fact, it appeared that his conduct 
was not criminal, but should more appropriately be 
adjudicated in a civil lawsuit, (see, Record on Appeal, 
Affidavit of Jerome Yeck and John T. Caine, filed with 
the Appellant's Motion to Withdraw a Plea). 
Following this discussion, Appellant released Attor-
ney Phil L. Hansen and retained John T. Caine to repre-
sent him in further Proceedings. Appellant immediately 
filed motions for withdrawal of his plea in both the 
Second and Third Judicial Districts. At the time of 
6 
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filing said Motions, Appellant had not been advised by either 
of the Adult Parole & Probation agencies in Weber or Salt 
Lake County, as to any recommendations made by them to 
the courts as to the sentence, nor was he advised by the 
court or any other office of the court, as to what his 
sentence would be (see, Record on Appeal, Affidavit of 
Jerome Yeck). On September 15 and 16, respectively, Appel-
lant appeared with Attorney John T. Caine in Second and 
Third Judicial District Courts. At this time, the courts 
took note of the application for withdrawal of the plea, 
continued sentencing, and set Appellant's motion for argu-
ment on September 22nd and September 23rd, respectively. 
On September 22nd and September 23rd, a hearing was held 
before Judge Calvin Gould and Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., 
respectively, on Appellant's applications for withdrawal 
of plea. Said application was made pursuant to 
§77-24-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Affidavits had 
theretofore been presented to the court by Appellant and 
his attorney, and oral arguments were conducted in each 
hearing. Following oral arguments, Judge Gould took the 
case under advisement, and ruled on October 5, 1976, in 
a Memorandu~ Decision, that Appellant's plea had been 
entered voluntarily, that defendant could not have been 
unaware of the import of the court's questioning at the 
time the plea was entered, and therefore the motion was 
7 
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denied. Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Jr., ruled on Appellant's 
motion immediately following the hearing. Judge Hansen's 
ruling was similar to Judge Gould's, with the additional 
finding that the state would not be prejudiced by allowing 
Appellant to withdraw his plea and go to trial on all 
charges, but that he believed in the exercise of his sound 
discretion, that withdrawal of the plea was not warranted 
in this case. It should be carefully noted that through-
out the record and transcript in this Appeal, Appellant 
consistentlv stated that if the pleas were withdrawn, he 
would expect to be tried on all counts, and that all plea 
negotiations would be vitiated by such withdrawals. Sub-
sequent to the above rulings, Appellant filed this 
Appeal, and pursuant to an agreement reached with Judge 
Stewart H. Hansen, Jr., underwent a 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation conducted in the community by the Utah State 
Prison staff. Judge Calvin Gould further agreed to stay 
any imposition of his sentence pending the outcome of 
the Appeal, and pending the 90-day evaluation. On Jan-
uary 14, 1977, Appellant appeared before Judge James 
Sawaya for sentencing, following the filing of the 90-day 
evaluation report. Judge Sawaya, acting upon the reports' 
recommendation, sentenced the defendant to serve a term 
in the Utah State Prison of not less than one, nor more 
than fifteen years. That sentence was later stayed, 
8 
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pending resolution of the Appeal before this court, and 
defendant was continued at liberty on an appeal bond. No 
action has yet been taken as to sentencing by Judge Calvin 
Gould in the Second Judicial District. 
ARGUMENT 
THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, AND AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DUE 
PROCESS, AND WHEN REQUESTED BY THE ACCUSED AT ANY TIME 
PRIOR TO SENTENCING, CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE STATE 
DEMONSTRATES THAT IT WILL BE IRREPARABLY DAMAGED OR THAT 
THERE IS A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST WHICH MUST BE SERVED. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states, in part: "That in all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed." This right 
to trial by jury is classified as are other important and 
basic concepts enunciated by the Constitution, as 
fundamental. This important classification makes it 
incumbent upon those attempting to deny such a right to 
demonstrate compelling reasons for their action. Trial 
by jury is an essential ingredient of due process, appli-
cable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(See, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, (1967), reaffirmed 
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1975), when the Su1neme 
9 
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to an 
accused of the right to trial is fundamental, and is imposed 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on 
the states.) Such a fundamental right should not and 
cannot be a subject of judicial discretion as to its 
imposition or its abrogation. This court has heretofore 
announced in the cases of State v. Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825 (1932), 
and the more recent case of State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671(1963), 
that in effect, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty by 
an accused is discretionary with the court. Both of these 
dealt inter alia with whether or not the trial judge 
within his sound discretion, exercised that discretion 
properly in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the plea. 
This court, in upholding the free exercise of judicial 
discretion in this area, did not focus on the more criti-
cal issue of the denial of the right to trial by jury 
through the exercise of that discretion. It is interesting 
to note that in the instant case, both judges and prose-
cutors took the position that the burden of proof to 
demonstrate why the plea should be withdrawn, was on the 
defendant-appellant, and that through some nebulous standard, 
the court would then determine whether that hurden of 
proof was met and whether the courts' discretion should 
be exercised in the defendant's favor. This court should 
take careful note that, in effect, this is a complete 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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reversal of any judicial treatment of a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution. In cases dealing with the 
preservation of fundamental rights as essential to due 
process,the burden has been and is on the state to show 
that there is a compelling interest which abrogates or 
overrides the necessity to preserve the fundamental right. 
The only way, therefore, that this juxtaposition can be 
corrected in the instant case, is for this court to reverse 
their orevious decisions, and take the bold, but clearly, 
required step to place the burden of proof in denying the 
right to trial in the context of plea withdrawal squarely 
upon the state's shoylders. In the instant case, the 
Appellant requested, prior to sentencing, a trial by jury. 
He, in effect, through the Fourteenth Amendment, requested 
that the state insure due crocess and provide access to 
him of this most fundamental right. The state presented 
no comoelling reason or compelling interest that would 
justify or require denial of Appellant's fundamental 
right to trial by jury. Furthermore, Judge Hansen ruled 
that the state would in no way be harmed should the 
Aopellant be granted a new trial, but that in the exer-
cise of his discretion, he did not feel that a new trial 
was warranted. 
Some may argue that judicial discretion in this area 
is of legislative creation, and therefore more properly 
11 
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a subject for legislative correction. It would be a severe 
mistake for this court to relv on that tenuous oosition. 
The only statute involved in this case is §77-24-3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. This is a Procedural provision rather 
than a substantive provision of the law. This provision 
of the Code allows a defendant to make application for 
withdrawal of a plea and a request for trial prior to judg-
ment. The substantive application of the law in terms of 
allowing judicial discretion in this area has been court-
created in this state. This court, therefore, can correct 
what is obviously an unconstitutional practice in which 
the denial of the fundamental right is discretionary, 
where the burden of oroof is on that person asking to have 
his fundamental right enforced. There is no decision of 
this court or of any higher court which places the burden 
on the defendant to assume the burden of proof in assert-
ing his fundamental right. The State of Utah, through 
the conduit of the Fourteenth Amendment, is required to 
guarantee due process of law in state criminal proceedings. 
The preservation of due process is an inherent duly of 
the trial court, and this court ought not to allow the 
abrogation of that duty and the erosion of due process 
apparent in this case to stand without careful consider-
ation of the critical issues presented in this appeal. 
It would be very easy for this court to consider only 
12 
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lower court discretion and speak in terms of abuse of that 
discretion in resolving this Particular case, as Appellant 
readily concedes that there is no evidence to support an 
abuse of judicial discretion. However, the issue at the 
heart of this appeal is much more critical than to be given 
cursory review, or cursory judgment. This court has a 
responsibility, as the supreme judicial body of this state, 
to act as a guardian of individual rights, and it is 
incumbent upon this court to guarantee that those rights 
are not abrogated by a compulsion for protection of pro-
cedure in the criminal process. Appellant does not ask 
that this court reverse his conviction, nor does he ask 
that this court relieve him from the burden of being 
prosecuted by various state agencies. What Appellant 
does ask is that the state be required to present evi-
dence to a finder of fact, and prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant is guilty. The only method avail-
able to Appellant and to anyone desiring a forum for the 
presentation of all facts, is a trial. Some will argue 
that if this court takes a bold step in the preservation 
of individual rights in this particular instance, that 
everyone who enters into a plea negotiation and then later 
desires to withdraw his plea, will be allowed to do so 
and thus, plea negotiations will no longer be a viable 
alternative for prosecutors and defense attorneys, and 
13 
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the court will never know whether his discussions with an 
individual, upon the taking of a plea, are meaningless or 
will later be challenged in a proceedings of this nature. 
This court should carefully consider, in responding to 
this argument, that the fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Constitution at issue herein is the right to a trial 
by jury, not the right to plea bargain, with its atten-
dant advantages for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
the judiciary. Plea bargaining, as it is utilized in the 
processing of a criminal case in resnect to the avoidance 
of trial by .iury, is merely a procedural tool with which 
an accused may avail himself, if he so chooses. It does 
not take the place of a trial by jury in terms of consti-
tutional protection, nor in our society, should it ever 
be considered as a surrogate for a decision by one's peers. 
Therefore, neither the state, the prosecutor nor the 
judiciary, should ever take the position that the incon-
venience created by not being able to substitute an 
available procedure should take precedence over the 
protection of the fundamental right of trial by jury. 
Furthermore, judicial guidelines can and should be 
established to insure that the withdrawal of the plea 
and request for a trial is being done in good faith, 
without intent to delay or hinder prosecution, is timely 
made, and will not cause irreparable injury to the state. 
14 
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These guidelines could act as parameters for limited exercise 
of judicial discretion to insure the integrity of the 
system, without the relatively unfettered and indiscriminate 
abrogation of the right to trial by jury that currently 
exists under present conditions, where there are no guide-
lines an<l the burden is solely on the accused to justify 
his plea withdrawal, and his only recourse to demonstrate 
abuse of judicial discretion. 
In the instant case, the defendant, through affidavit 
and in oral argument, demonstrated his good faith in 
requesting a trial by jury. This request was made at an 
appropriate time prior to the knowledge of a potential 
sentence and prior to the imposition of that sentence. 
There was no demonstrable irreparable harm or damage to 
the state, nor any compelling reason presented which would 
justify removal of the basic protection of the fundamental 
right of trial by jury afforded to Appellant by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as an integral part of due process. 
Therefore, the trial courts, in both cases, were in error 
in not preserving trial by jury for the Appellant and this 
Court must now, to avoid any further vagueness or ambiguity 
in this critical area, demonstrate by judicial fiat that 
the right to trial by jury is paramount and is an essen-
tial element of due process which must be preserved 
through all stages of the criminal process until sentence 
is imposed. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
The application for withdrawal of plea, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is procedural in nature. The 
concept of judicial discretion which has heretofore been 
adhered to by this court in reviewing the withdrawal of a 
plea in a criminal case, has been court-created and is 
not imposed by any statute. The right to trial by jury 
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution, and is a basic element of due process 
guaranteed to all individuals by the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This court has never before reviewed 
the preservation of this fundamental right in the context 
of plea withdrawal in a criminal case. The preservation 
of trial by jury must be guaranteed by the trial court in 
all cases and where, in the context of a plea withdrawal, 
a jury trial is requested, the burden must shift to the 
state to show a compelling state interest or a compelling 
reason why the accused should not be allowed trial by 
jury. The trial court should have discretion to determine 
whether or not the application is in good faith and timely, 
and whether irreparable damage will be done to the state. 
In the instant case, the aoolication was made in good 
faith, timely, and there was no showing by the state of 
any compelling reason or compelling state interest for the 
vitiation of the fundamental riRht of trial by jury, nor 
16 
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was an irreparable damage to the state de~onstrated. 
Wherefore, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
court reverse the decisions of the Second and Third Judi-
cial District Courts, and allow defendant-appellant to have 
a trial by jury on all counts heretofore filed against him 
by the Second and Third Judicial Districts, and pending 
against him by the Utah State Attorney General's office. 
submitted, 
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STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Comes now Donna Czekala, bein8 first duly sworn 
upon her oath, and deposes and says that she mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the 
following persons: 
Mr. Earl Darius 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
5alt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on this 4th dav of March, 1977. 
DONNA CZEKALA 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
March, 1977. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
day of 
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